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Abstract 
This study assesses the role of income levels (low and middle) in modulating governance 
(political and economic) to influence inclusive human development. The empirical evidence 
is based on interactive quantile regressions and forty-nine countries in sub-Saharan Africa for 
the period 2000-2002.The following main findings are established. First, low income 
modulates governance (economic and political) to positively affect inclusive human 
development exclusively in countries with above-median levels of inclusive human 
development. It follows that countries with averagely higher levels of inclusive human 
development are more likely to benefit from the relevance of income levels in influencing 
governance for inclusive development.  Second, the importance of middle income in 
modulating political governance to positively affect inclusive human is apparent exclusively 
in the median while the relevance of middle income in moderating economic governance to 
positively influence inclusive human development is significantly apparent in the 10th and 75th 
quantiles. Third, regardless of panels, income levels modulate economic governance to affect 
inclusive human development at a higher magnitude, compared to political governance. 
Policy implications are discussed in the light of the post-2015 agenda of sustainable 
development goals and contemporary development paradigms.  This study complements the 
extant sparse literature on the inclusive human development in Africa. 
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1. Introduction 
 Four main factors in scholarly and policy-making circles motivate this study on the 
poverty tragedy in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), notably, the: (i) growing exclusive development 
in the sub-region; (ii) evolving literature on the relevance of the middle class in sustainable 
development outcomes; (iii) paradigms shifts in the conception of governance in the light 
contemporary dominant models of economic development and (iv) gaps in the literature.  
These factors which articulate the fact that “Output may be growing, and yet the mass of the 
people may be becoming poorer” (Lewis, 1955), are expanded in chronological order.  
 First, in the post-2015 development era, one of the most challenging policy syndromes 
to Africa’s development is exclusive development2. Accordingly, the reduction of inequality 
is central to most Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This concern about poverty is even 
more relevant to SSA because approximately half of countries in the sub-region did not 
achieve the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) extreme poverty target (Tchamyou, 2019, 
2020; Tchamyou et al., 2019a, 2019b; Asongu & le Roux, 2017, 2019). It is important to 
emphasise that the number of people living in extreme poverty consistently increased across 
the sub-region in spite of more than two decades of economic growth resurgence. The poverty 
tragedy is therefore traceable to exclusive development because the response of poverty to 
economic growth is a decreasing function of inequality (Fosu, 2015; Asongu & Kodila-
Tedika, 2017, 2018).  
The importance of promoting shared prosperity in the post-2015 development agenda in SSA 
is supported by the conclusions of Bicaba et al. (2017) who articulate that if poverty is to be 
reduced to a threshold of below 3% by the year 2030, governments of countries in the sub-
region will have to pay particular attention to inclusive development: “This paper examines its 
feasibility for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the world’s poorest but growing region. It finds that 
under plausible assumptions extreme poverty will not be eradicated in SSA by 2030, but it can 
be reduced to low levels through high growth and income redistribution towards the poor 
segments of the society” (Bicaba et al., 2017, p. 93). In accordance with the evolving 
narratives, this study focuses on inequality-adjusted or pro-poor human development within 
                                                          
2
 The notion of  policy  syndrome is understood by Fosu (2013) to represent factors that are unfavorable to 
economic development, notably: “administered redistribution”, “state breakdown”, “state controls”, and 
“suboptimal inter temporal resource allocation”.  According to Asongu (2017), a policy syndrome is a 
knowledge economy gap between two countries. In this study, a policy syndrome represents exclusive 
development, in accordance with recent pro-poor development literature (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017; 
Tchamyou et al., 2019a).  
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the context of an evolving stream of literature on the importance of the middle class in 
Africa’s development.   
 Second, the relevance of middle income status and the middle class in economic 
development has been articulated in a number of scholarly fronts, notably: (i) historical views 
establishing that the middle class is crucial for the economic development of technically-
advanced countries in Europe and North America (Adelman & Morris, 1997; Landes, 1998). 
(ii) Contemporary scholarly perspectives have documented the  importance of the middle 
class in, inter alia: alleviating poverty (Easterly, 2001); ameliorating social evolutions 
(Sridharan, 2004); consolidating institutions (Birdsall, 2007a); entrepreneurship and 
innovation activities (Banerjee & Duflo, 2009); institutional reforms (Loyza et al., 2012); 
promoting democracy (Kodila-Tedika et al., 2016) and boosting inclusive development 
(Birdsall, 2010). This study extends the last stream on pro-poor development by engaging 
inclusive development within the framework of dominant contemporary development 
paradigms.  
 Third, consistent with Asongu and le Roux (2019), the middle class is crucial in the 
understanding of the two dominant contemporary models of development, namely: the 
Washington Consensus and the Beijing Model.  The latter is defined as “state capitalism, de-
emphasised democracy and priority in economic rights” whereas the former is defined as 
“private capitalism, liberal democracy and priority in political rights” (Asongu, 2016a). The 
attendant literature is in accordance with the position that a sustained middle class is crucial 
for political governance to be sustainably demanded by the population. Hence, in order for 
political governance (i.e. a priority of the Washington Consensus) to be sustainably achieved, 
economic governance (i.e. priority of the Beijing Model) should take precedence in policy-
making.  China has produced a burgeoning middle class within a historically short period of 
time (Asongu & Ssozi, 2016). In summary, the narrative supports the view that political 
governance should be a longer term goal for African countries compared to economic 
governance which should be a short term goal in order to build the middle class necessary for 
a sustainable the demand for political governance. This study extends the underlying strand of 
literature within the framework of inclusive human development, by attempting to answer the 
following research question: how do low income and middle income countries complement 
political and economic governance in influencing inclusive human development in SSA? This 
research question is relevant given an apparent gap in the scholarly literature.  
 Fourth, the positioning of this study departs from two strands of literature on inclusive 
human development, namely: (i) recent studies on fighting exclusive development in Africa 
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and (ii) scholarship on nexuses between the middle class and development outcomes. The first 
strand includes: the relevance of sustaining economic growth levels of 2000 to 2010 if 
extreme poverty is to be eliminated by 2030 (Chandy et al., 2013; Ravallion, 2013; Yoshida 
et al., 2014);  nexuses between inequality, economic growth and poverty (Thorbecke, 2013; 
Ncube et al., 2014; Fosu, 2017a, 2017b); linkages between consumption, income and the 
wealth of the most poor (De Magalhães &  Santaeulàlia-Llopis, 2018); connections between 
corruption and inequality (Sulemana &  Kpienbaareh, 2018); relationships between 
inequality, financial access and education (Tchamyou, 2019, 2020; Meniago & Asongu, 2018; 
Tchamyou et al., 2019a; Mannah-Blankson, 2018); reinventing foreign aid (Jones & Tarp, 
2015; Page & Söderbom, 2015; Asongu, 2016b)  and development paradigms (Kuada, 
2015) for inclusive development and nexuses between foreign investment, the middle class,  
remittances, external debts and inclusive economic development (Asongu et al., 2015; 
Asongu & Leke, 2019;  Kaulihowa & Adjasi, 2018).  
The second strand of studies pertaining to the importance of the middle class has 
focused on four scholarly perspectives, notably, the: measurement of the middle class 
(Resnick, 2015a, 2015b; Mattes, 2015; Cheeseman, 2015; Shimeles & Ncube, 2015; Thurlow 
et al., 2015; Tschirley et al., 2015); linkages between the middle class and economic 
development (Handley, 2015; Tschirley et al., 2015; Kodila-Tedika et al., 2016); the 
relationship between the middle class and governance standards (Resnick, 2015b; Cheeseman, 
2015; Mattes, 2015)    and the importance of the middle class in contemporary development 
paradigms (i.e. the Washington Consensus and the Beijing Model) in the light of Africa’s 
development challenges (Asongu, 2016a; Asongu & le Roux, 2019).  
 The study in the literature closest to this research is Asongu and le Roux (2019) which 
has investigated the role of income levels in facilitating development outcomes by means of 
governance channels using an estimation technique (i.e. Fixed effects regressions) that 
articulates mean values of inclusive human development. The shortcoming of the underlying 
study is that it establishes blanket policy implications. Accordingly, the investigated 
relationships (from which the conclusions are drawn), could be contingent on initial levels of 
inclusive human development such that the nexuses have different tendencies in countries 
with low, intermediate and high levels of inclusive human development. This study accounts 
for initial levels of the inclusive human development by using an estimation technique that 
accounts for existing levels of human development, namely: Quantile regressions.  
 It is worthwhile to clarify that political and economic governance used in this study 
are closely related to inclusive human development in the perspectives that: (i) favourable  
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political governance  (in terms of political stability/no violence  and voice & accountability) 
enable a conducive environment for economic prosperity that is relevant for socio-economic 
development and equitable distribution of fruits of economic prosperity and (ii) good 
economic governance (entailing regulation quality and government effectiveness) is related to 
the formulation and implementation of policies that deliver public commodities which are 
largely education, health and social services. The conceptions of political and economic 
governance dynamics are consistent with the attendant literature:  “The first concept is about 
the process by which those in authority are selected and replaced (Political Governance): 
voice and accountability and political stability. The second has to do with the capacity of 
government to formulate and implement policies, and to deliver services (Economic 
Governance): regulatory quality and government effectiveness” (Andres et al., 2015, p. 1041; 
Ajide & Raheem, 2016a, 2016b; Amavilah et al., 2017; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2020a). 
 The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and 
methodology while the empirical results are covered in section 3. Section 4 concludes with 
implications and future research directions.   
 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1 Data  
The research examines a panel of forty-nine countries in SSA for the period 2000-2012 with 
data from five mean sources, notably, the: (i) World Governance Indicators of the World 
Bank for governance indicators; (ii) World Development Indicators of the World Bank for 
income levels and control variables; (iii) Financial Development and Structure Database 
(FDSD) of the World Bank for some control variables; (iv) United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) for the inclusive development variable and (v) principal component 
analysis (PCA) for composite governance indicators. The temporal and geographical scopes 
of the study are constrained by data availability.  
 In the light of recent African development literature and the motivation of this study, 
the inequality-adjusted human development index (IHDI) is used as the outcome variable 
(Asongu et al., 2015). The six governance indicators from Kaufmann et al. (2010) are 
bundled with PCA for composite indicators, notably: (i) political governance (proxied by 
political stability and “voice & accountability”) which is the election and replacement of 
political leaders; (ii) economic governance (measured with government effectiveness and 
regulation quality) understood as the formulation and implementation of policies that deliver 
public commodities and (iii) institutional governance (proxied with corruption-control and the 
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rule of law) is defined as the formulation and implementation of policies that deliver public 
commodities.  
 In line with Asongu (2014, p. 364), the income level classification is consistent with 
World Bank income groups. These are: high income, $12,276 or more; upper middle income, 
$3,976-$12,275; lower middle income, $1,006-$3,975 and low income, $1,005 or less. Four 
control variables are adopted in order to account for variable omission bias, namely: Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita growth, private domestic credit, remittances and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) inflows. These control variables are motivated by recent African 
inequality and economic development literature (Mishra et al., 2011; Mlachila et al., 2017;  
Seneviratne & Sun, 2013; Anand et al., 2012;  Ssozi & Asongu, 2016; Tchamyou, 2019, 
2020; Meniago & Asongu, 2018). With the exception of remittances, the remaining three 
control variables are expected to negatively affect inclusive human development. As recently 
argued by Anyanwu (2011), Tchamyou et al. (2019a) and Meniago and Asongu (2018), 
remittances negatively affect inclusive human development because those migrating to 
developed countries from poor nations are largely from wealthy factions for the population 
who have the financial resources for the visa processes and administrative procedures. 
Mlachila et al. (2017) have established a positive relationship between the other three 
variables and pro-poor development. The definitions and sources of variables are provided in 
Appendix 1 while the summary statistics is disclosed in Appendix 2. The correlation matrix is 
provided in Appendix 3.  
 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
In the light of the correlation matrix, the motivation of the study and recent empirical 
literature (Tchamyou, 2017; Asongu et al., 2018), the PCA is used to reduce the dimensions 
of variables into composite indicators called principal components (PCs). The PCA is a 
technique that is employed in empirical literature to reduce highly correlated variable into a 
set of smaller uncorrelated PCs. The procedure for adopting the main PCs is the Kaiser (1974) 
criterion which suggests that PCs with an eigenvalue greater than one and reflecting about 
70% of the total variation should be selected.  
The results presented in Table 1 summarise the results of the PCA. It can be observed 
that political governance (Polgov) has an eigenvalue of 1.671 and reflects a total variability of 
83.50%. Hence, 85.50% of information contained in “voice & accountability” and political 
stability is captured by the composite political governance indicator. In the same vein, 
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economic governance (Ecogov) reflects 93.90% of common information in government 
effectiveness and regulation quality and has an eigenvalue of 1.878. The institutional 
governance composite indicator (Instgov) is informational and not used in the empirical 
analysis in the light of the focus of the study on economic governance and political 
governance. The PC-derived composite indicators can provide robust estimates. The 
interested reader can refer to the attendant literature for insights into consistency, efficiency 
and inferential validity of PC-derived regressors (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a, 2016b).   
 
Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Governance (Gov) 
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix (Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 VA PS RQ GE RL CC    
          
First PC (Polgov) 0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.835 0.835 1.671 
Second PC -0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.164 1.000 0.328 
          
First PC (Ecogov) --- --- 0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.939 0.939 1.878 
Second PC --- --- -0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.060 1.000 0.121 
          
First PC (Instgov) --- --- --- --- 0.707 0.707 0.930 0.930 1.861 
Second PC --- --- --- --- -0.707 0.707 0.069 1.000 0.138 
          
P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: 
Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. Polgov (Political Governance): First PC of VA & PS. Ecogov (Economic Governance): First 
PC of RQ & GE. Instgov (Institutional Governance): First PC of RL & CC.  
 
2.2.2 Empirical Strategy 
 The adopted estimation approach is in line with studies on the importance of adapting 
the estimation technique to data behaviour (Dana & Dana, 2005; Kou et al., 2012, 2014, 2016, 
2019a, 2019b; Dana, 2014; Li et al., 2014, 2016; Dana & Dumez, 2015; Zhang et al., 2019).  
Consistent with the motivation of the study, this research departs from Asongu and le Roux 
(2019) by adopting an empirical strategy that accounts for initial levels of inclusive human 
development. Accordingly, the adopted Quantile regressions (QR) estimation approach is 
tailored to emphasis low, intermediate and high initial levels of inclusive human development.  
 In accordance with the attendant empirical literature (Koenker & Bassett, 1978; 
Koenker, 2005; Hao & Naiman, 2007; Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu, 2013; Tchamyou & 
Asongu, 2018; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c), the QR approach is different 
from the technique used by Asongu and le Roux (2019) because,  it: (i) determines 
conditional quantiles (versus conditional mean); is based on sufficient data (versus an OLS 
technique which can be used on small data); follows an agnostic distribution (versus the 
normality assumption); is computationally more intensive (versus a linear technique which is 
computationally less intensive) and is robust to the control of outliers (versus sensitivity to 
outliers). 
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The  th quantile estimator of inclusive human development is obtained by solving for 
the following optimization problem which, is presented without subscripts in Eq. (1) for the 
purpose of simplicity and readability.   
    
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,                                                 (1) 
where  1,0 . As opposed to OLS which is based on the minimization of the sum of 
squared residuals, with QR, it is the weighted sum of absolute deviations that is minimized. 
For example, the 25th or 75th quantiles (with  =0.25 or 0.75, respectively) are estimated by 
approximately weighing the residuals. The conditional quantile of inclusive human 
development or iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(  ,                                                                                                        (2) 
 
where unique slope parameters are estimated for each  th specific quantile. This formulation 
is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are examined only at the 
mean of the conditional distribution of inclusive development. For Eq. (2), the dependent 
variable iy  is inclusive human development whereas ix  contains: a constant term, governance, 
income levels, GDP per capita growth; credit access, remittances and FDI inflows. 
 In the light of the above, separate regression equations for the QR and OLS for the 
research question being investigated are as follows. 
tititi XIHDI ,,10,  
                                                                                                    
(3) 
 
)(
,,1
)(
1
)(
0,
p
titi
pp
ti XIHDI                                                                                            (4) 
 
The OLS and QR respectively in Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) above focus on the relevance of income 
levels in modulating governance (political and economic) for inclusive human development, 
where, tiIHDI , is inclusive human development   for country i  in  period t , 0  is a constant,
X entails income levels, governance  and other control variables (GDP per capita growth; 
credit access, remittances and FDI inflows),  and ti , is the error term.  
 
3. Empirical results  
Table 2 presents the empirical results. While Panel A shows how low income levels modulate 
governance to influence inclusive development, Panel B discloses findings on how middle 
income levels modulate governance to affect the same outcome variable. The left hand-side 
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and right hand-side of both panels focus on respectively, political governance and economic 
governance.  
 
Table 2: Income and Governance  
             
 Dependent variable: Inclusive human development  
 
 
 Panel A: Low Income and governance 
             
 Low Income and Political Governance Low Income and Economic Governance 
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
Constant  0.507*** 0.404*** 0.467*** 0.493*** 0.509*** 0.602*** 0.491*** 0.406*** 0.459*** 0.480*** 0.484*** 0.541*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LI -0.115*** -
0.119*** 
-
0.139*** 
-
0.099*** 
-
0.077*** 
-
0.113*** 
-
0.102*** 
-0.122*** -
0.126*** 
-
0.090*** 
-
0.066*** 
-0.062** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.031) 
PG 0.041*** -0.003 0.021*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.060*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.525) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
EG --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.042*** -0.004 0.035*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.062*** 
       (0.000) (0.536) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LI× PG -0.031*** 0.011 -0.005 -0.022** -
0.037*** 
-
0.070*** 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.159) (0.601) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000)       
LI ×EG --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.017** 0.018* -0.004 -0.0002 -0.017** -0.063** 
       (0.027) (0.056) (0.734) (0.980) (0.037) (0.015) 
GDPpcg 0.0008 0.0007 0.002 -0.0006 0.0009 0.002 0.0006 0.0006 0.001 -0.0008 0.00006 0.001 
 (0.478) (0.548) (0.156) (0.651) (0.404) (0.264) (0.552) (0.582) (0.474) (0.476) (0.954) (0.579) 
Credit  0.0009*** 0.001*** 0.0009** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.00004 0.0007** 0.001*** 0.0006 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0002 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.913) (0.015) (0.000) (0.157) (0.000) (0.000) (0.816) 
Remittances   -0.002*** 0.0003 -0.001** -
0.001*** 
-
0.002*** 
-
0.003*** 
-
0.001*** 
0.0003 -0.001 -
0.001*** 
-
0.001*** 
-0.002* 
 (0.000) (0.520) (0.044) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.575) (0.120) (0.003) (0.002) (0.066) 
FDI  0.0004 0.0008 0.0003 -0.001 0.001* 0.002** 0.001** 0.001 0.001 0.0007 0.0003 0.002 
 (0.387) (0.159) (0.655) (0.130) (0.055) (0.029) (0.024) (0.103) (0.146) (0.197) (0.554) (0.206) 
             
Net   Effects 0.021 na na 0.025 0.016 0.015 0.031 na na na 0.029 0.022 
             
Fisher 59.37***      61.34***      
Pseudo R² 0.599 0.335 0.316 0.303 0.433 0.537 0.596 0.345 0.343 0.352 0.439 0.488 
Observations 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 
             
             
 Panel B: Middle  Income and Governance 
             
 Middle  Income and Political Governance Middle  Income and Economic Governance 
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
Constant  0.392*** 0.284*** 0.327*** 0.393*** 0.432*** 0.489*** 0.389*** 0.284*** 0.332*** 0.389*** 0.417*** 0.478*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MI 0.115*** 0.119*** 0.139*** 0.099*** 0.077*** 0.113*** 0.102*** 0.122*** 0.126*** 0.090*** 0.066*** 0.062** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.032) 
PG 0.009* 0.007 0.015** 0.016** 0.002 -0.010 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.091) (0.188) (0.043) (0.028) (0.610) (0.251)       
EG --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.024*** 0.014* 0.030** 0.042*** 0.023*** -0.0007 
       (0.000) (0.051) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.969) 
MI× PG 0.031*** -0.011 0.005 0.022** 0.037*** 0.070*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.159) (0.601) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000)       
MI ×EG --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.017** 0.018* 0.004 0.0002 0.017** 0.063** 
       (0.027) (0.056) (0.734) (0.980) (0.037) (0.015) 
GDPpcg 0.0008 0.0007 0.002 -0.0006 0.0009 0.002 0.0006 0.0006 0.001 -0.0008 0.00006 0.001 
 (0.478) (0.548) (0.156) (0.651) (0.404) (0.264) (0.552) (0.582) (0.474) (0.476) (0.954) (0.579) 
Credit  0.0009*** 0.001*** 0.0009** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.00004 0.0007** 0.001*** 0.0006 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0002 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.913) (0.015) (0.000) (0.157) (0.000) (0.000) (0.816) 
Remittances  -0.002*** 0.0003 -0.001** -
0.001*** 
-
0.002*** 
-
0.003*** 
-
0.001*** 
0.0003*** -0.001 -
0.001*** 
-
0.001*** 
-0.002* 
 (0.000) (0.520) (0.044) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.575) (0.120) (0.003) (0.002) (0.066) 
FDI  0.0004 0.0008 0.0003 -0.001 0.001* 0.002** 0.001** 0.001 0.001 0.0007 0.0003 0.002 
 (0.387) (0.159) (0.655) (0.130) (0.055) (0.029) (0.024) (0.103) (0.146) (0.197) (0.554) (0.206) 
             
Net   Effects 0.020 na na 0.024 na na 0.030 0.025 na na 0.029 na 
             
Fisher 59.37***      61.34***      
Pseudo R² 0.599 0.335 0.316 0.303 0.433 0.537 0.596 0.345 0.343 0.352 0.439 0.488 
Observations 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 310 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Bilaid: Bilateral aid. LI: Low Income. MI: Middle Income. PG: Political 
Governance. EG: Economic Governance. GDPpcg: Gross Domestic Product per capita growth. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. OLS: 
Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where inclusive 
human development is least. na: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is not 
significant. The mean value of Low Income is 0.632 while the mean value of Middle Income 0.367. 
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In order to assess the overall impact of the relevance of income levels in moderating 
governance for inclusive development, net effects are computed from the unconditional effect 
of governance and the conditional impact resulting from the interaction between income 
levels and the corresponding governance dynamic. For instance, in the first column of Table 
2, the net effect of low income levels in modulating political governance for inclusive human 
development is 0.021 ([-0.031× 0.632] + [0.041]). In the computation, the mean value of low 
income countries is 0.632, the unconditional effect of political governance is 0.041 while the 
conditional impact from the interaction between low income and political governance is -
0.031. In the same vein, in the last column of Panel A in Table 2, the net impact of low 
income in modulating economic governance for inclusive development is 0.022 ([-0.063× 
0.632] + [0.062]).  In the computation, the mean value of low income countries is 0.632, the 
unconditional effect of economic governance is 0.062 while the conditional impact from the 
interaction between low income and economic governance is -0.063. 
It is important to note that the findings of OLS and QR are distinct in terms of 
significance and magnitude of significance because the OLS findings vary throughout the 
conditional distribution of inclusive human development. This heterogeneity confirms the 
relevance of assessing the investigated linkages throughout the conditional distributions of 
inclusive human development. The following findings can be established. First, low income 
modulates governance (economic and political) to positively affect inclusive human 
development exclusively in countries with above-median levels of inclusive human 
development. It follows that countries with averagely higher levels of inclusive human 
development are more likely to benefit from the relevance of income levels in influencing 
governance for inclusive development.   
Second, in Panel B, the importance of middle income in modulating political 
governance to positively affect inclusive human is apparent exclusively in the median while 
the relevance of middle income in moderating economic governance to positively influence 
inclusive human development apparent in the 10th and 75th quantiles.  
Third, from the OLS results, regardless of panels, income levels modulate economic 
governance to affect inclusive human development at a higher magnitude, compared to 
political governance. This finding is logical in the light of the definition of economic 
governance which is conceptually more associated with inclusive development compared to 
political governance. Accordingly, economic governance is the formulation and 
implementation of policies that deliver public commodities, which include education and 
health amenities captured by inequality-adjusted human development.  
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 Fourth, the significant control variables have the expected signs. Accordingly, with the 
exception of remittances, the other variables involved in the conditioning information set 
positively affect inclusive human development.  
 In order to connect the findings with the relevant literature, it is important to note that, 
results established in this study broadly confirm two strands of research, though within the 
framework of inclusive development being assessed throughout the conditional distribution of 
inclusive human development. These two strands of the literature are: (i) studies on the 
importance of governance in improving human development conditions (Fosu, 2013; 
Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014; Fonchingong, 2014; Efobi, 2015; Asongu & Odhiambo,2020b) 
and (ii) research on the importance of income levels in socio-economic and human 
development outcomes (Adelman & Morris, 1967; Landes, 1998; Easterly, 2001; Birdsall, 
2007a, 2007b; 2010; Sridharan, 2004; Banerjee & Duflo, 2009; Loyza et al., 2012; Kodila-
Tedika et al., 2016).  
 
4. Concluding implications and future research directions 
The literature is consistent on the view that close to half of countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) did not achieve the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) extreme poverty target. 
Moreover, the number people living in extreme poverty have been increasing in the sub-
region since the mid 1990s. This study complements existing literature on dominant 
development paradigms (i.e. the Washington Consensus versus the Beijing Model) by 
assessing the role of income levels (low and middle) in modulating governance (political and 
economic) to influence inclusive human development. The empirical evidence is based on 
interactive quantile regressions and forty-nine countries in SSA for the period 2000-2002. 
 The following main findings are established. First, low income modulates governance 
(economic and political) to positively affect inclusive human development exclusively in 
countries with above-median levels of inclusive human development. It follows that countries 
with averagely higher levels of inclusive human development are more likely to benefit from 
the relevance of income levels in influencing governance for inclusive development.   
 Second, the relevance of middle income in modulating political governance to 
positively affect inclusive human is apparent exclusively in the median while the importance 
of middle income in moderating economic governance to positive influence inclusive human 
development is apparent in the 10th and 75th quantiles. Third, from the OLS results, regardless 
of panels, income levels modulate economic governance to affect inclusive human 
development at a higher magnitude, compared to political governance. Policy implications are 
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discussed in the light of the post-2015 agenda of sustainable development goals and 
contemporary development paradigms.   
The benefit of low income levels in modulating governance (political and economic) 
to positively affect inclusive human development is a positive function of inclusive human 
development. It confirms the hypothesis that the response of poverty to development is a 
decreasing function of inequality in the perspective that countries with comparatively higher 
levels of inclusive development will benefit more from the ability of low income countries to 
leverage on governance to affect inclusive human development in the post-2015 development 
agenda. This conclusion is in line with Bicaba et al. (2017) on the importance of reducing 
inequality for shared economic development if SSA is to eradicate extreme poverty by 2030. 
 The fact that irrespective of income levels, income modulates economic governance to 
affect inclusive human development at a higher magnitude than political governance is 
evidence of the fact that focusing on economic governance will engender more inclusive 
development benefits compared to political governance. Hence, prioritising economic 
governance will be more beneficial for inclusive development compared to the corresponding 
benefits from prioritising political governance. It is relevant to note that in the light of the 
motivation of the study, political governance is a priority of the Washington Consensus while 
economic governance is a priority of the Beijing Model. Future studies can use relevant 
estimation approaches to assess country-specific cases in order to provide more targeted 
policy implications.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Definitions and sources of variables  
    
Variables  Signs  Definitions  Sources 
    
Inclusive 
development 
IHDI Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index UNDP 
    
 
 
Political 
Stability  
 
 
PolS 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the perceptions 
of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional and violent means, including domestic 
violence and terrorism”. 
 
WGI 
    
 
Voice & 
Accountability  
 
VA 
“Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the extent to which a 
country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government 
and to enjoy freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free 
media” 
 
WGI 
    
Political 
Governance  
Polgov First Principal Component of Political Stability and Voice & 
Accountability. The process by which those in authority are  
selected and replaced. 
PCA 
    
 
Government 
Effectiveness  
 
 
GE 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the quality of public 
services, the quality and degree of independence from political 
pressures of the civil service, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of governments’ commitments to 
such policies”. 
 
 
WGI 
    
 
Regulation 
Quality 
 
RQ 
“Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development”. 
 
WGI 
    
Economic 
Governance  
Ecogov “First Principal Component of Government Effectiveness and 
Regulation Quality. The capacity of government to formulate & 
implement policies, and to deliver services”.  
PCA 
    
 
Corruption-
Control 
 
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty 
and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by 
elites and private interests” 
 
WGI 
    
 
 
Rule of Law  
 
 
RL 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” 
 
 
 
WGI 
    
Institutional 
Governance  
Instgov First Principal Component of Rule of Law and Corruption-Control. 
The respect for citizens and the state of institutions  
that govern the interactions among them 
PCA 
    
GDP per capita  GDPpcg GDP per Capita growth rate  
    
Private Credit  Credit Private credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions (% of 
GDP) 
WDI 
    
Remittance  Remit  Remittance inflows (% of GDP) WDI 
    
Foreign 
investment 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment net inflows (% of GDP) WDI 
    
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme. WDI: World Development Indicators. WGI: World Governance 
Indicators. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics 
      
 Mean  SD Min Max Obs 
Inequality Adj. Human Development  0.721 3.505 0.129 0.768 485 
Political Stability  -0.543 0.956 -3.323 1.192 578 
Voice & Accountability  -0.646 0.737 -2.233 0.990 578 
Political Governance  0.000 1.292 -3.440 2.583 578 
Government Effectiveness  -0.771 0.620 -2.450 0.934 577 
Economic Governance  0.002 1.367 -4.049 3.807 577 
Regulation Quality -0.715 0.644 -2.665 0.983 578 
Corruption-Control -0.642 0.591 -1.924 1.249 579 
Rule of Law  -0.741 0.662 -2.668 1.056 578 
Institutional Governance  0.0002 1.364 -3.588 3.766 578 
GDP per Capita growth  2.198 5.987 -49.761 58.363 608 
Private Domestic Credit 18.551 22.472 0.550 149.78 507 
Remittances  3.977 8.031 0.000 64.100 434 
Net Foreign Direct Investment Inflows 5.332 8.737 -6.043 91.007 603 
Low Income Countries  0.632 0.482 0.000 1.000 637 
Middle Income Countries  0.367 0.482 0.000 1.000 637 
      
SD: Standard deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations. Adj: Adjusted.  
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Correlation Matrix (Uniform sample size: 310) 
               
Governance Variables  Control Variables  Dep. Vble  
PolS VA Polgov GE RQ Ecogov CC RL Instgov GDPpcg Credit Remit FDI IHDI  
1.000 0.688 0.923 0.653 0.625 0.674 0.692 0.777 0.763 -0.011 0.279 0.032 -0.018 0.411 PolS 
 1.000 0.914 0.774 0.734 0.779 0.683 0.810 0.775 0.113 0.452 0.042 -0.010 0.361 VA 
  1.000 0.775 0.753 0.789 0.748 0.863 0.837 0.053 0.396 0.041 -0.015 0.421 Polgov 
   1.000 0.877 0.972 0.836 0.897 0.900 0.118 0.543 0.020 -0.152 0.584 GE 
    1.000 0.965 0.799 0.856 0.860 -0.0001 0.532 -0.076 -0.192 0.512 RQ 
 
    1.000 0.845 0.906 0.909 0.064 0.555 -0.036 -0.177 0.568 Ecogov 
      1.000 0.851 0.962 0.053 0.469 -0.196 -0.104 0.519 CC 
       1.000 0.961 0.070 0.471 0.079 -0.084 0.507 RL 
 
       
1.000 0.064 0.489 -0.062 -0.098 0.534 Instgov 
         1.000 0.029 0.026 0.172 0.077 GDPpcg 
          1.000 -0.095 -0.082 0.536 Credit 
           1.000 0.122 -0.043 Remit 
            1.000 -0.026 FDI 
             1.000 IHDI 
               
PolS: Political Stability. VA: Voice & Accountability. Polgov: Political Governance.  GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation 
Quality. Ecogov: Economic Governance. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: Rule of Law. Instgov: Institutional Governance.  GDPpcg : GDP per 
capita growth rate. Credit: Private domestic credit. Remit: Remittances. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. IHDI: Inequality Adjusted Human 
Development Index. Dep. Vble: Dependent Variable.     
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